“OPENING THE BARBARIANS’ GATE” OR WATCHING THE BARBARIANS FROM THE
COLISEUM:
A REQUIEM ON THE NOMOS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
Marc L. Roark±

"By the advice of their protectors (the Romans), they (the Britons) now built a
wall across the island from one sea to the other, which being manned with a proper
force, might be a terror to the foes whom it was intended to repel, and a protection to
their friends whom it covered. But this wall, being made of turf instead of stone, was of
no use to that foolish people, who had no head to guide them."
GILDAS, DE EXCIDIOET CONQUESTU
BRITANNIAE (Trans. J.A. Giles).

In their original form, they were watched by very few spectators who had to
squeeze in against each other, pushing and jostling, straining and craning their necks to
get a look at the bloody action being played out before them. These rough
congregations, in which the spectators quickly planted themselves wherever they could
find a place with a decent view, contained the seeds of the great spectacles of later years.
They were primitive showcases for fighting and nothing more, and were certainly not
prepared or stage managed in the manner that would later become commonplace….
It was not long, however, before seats were added and hired out to spectators who
were thus afforded a little more comfort as they watched each pair of gladiators fight…
ALAN BAKER, THE SECRET HISTORY OF ROME’S
WARRIOR SLAVES 8-9 (2002).

Abstract
Comparative Law tends to focus on the differences and similarities present in
different legal systems. Such analysis has led some to conclude that a third legal system
has appeared in the West and in particular in Louisiana. The idea of a mixed jurisdiction,
they claim, combines certain elements of Civil law and Common law into a hybrid
system. This article challenges the supposition that a legal system’s core identity can be
of a mixed nature. Rather, this article suggests that the proper way a legal system should
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be viewed is through its normative values as depicted in the narratives the system spawns
– a Nomos that directs the purveyors of the system towards the sources and identity that
the system enchants. Focusing primarily on Louisiana, Part I of this article describes
three normative elements that narratives tell about the Louisiana civil law: its frenchness,
its distinctiveness, and its dependency on a Code. Part II then tells two narratives that
demonstrate how these narratives are revealed, even when they are not completely
accurate. Part III challenges the readers to inhabit the nomos.
Part I
Institutional Identity Versus Nomos
There is a story in human history that the barbarians sitting on the verge of
civilized society shaped human innovation.1 That, as uncivilized “tribes” threatened the
parameters of the modern world, society had no choice but to innovate and repel the
advances of chaos or themselves be infused with the chaos that the barbarians brought.
The Mongols, the Huns, the Gauls, the Celts, the Galics, the Turks, and the Germans each
were the driving force requiring societies on the other side to get better or disorganize.
There is a similar story told in legal communities in two variations. In law (at
least law in the Western Legal Tradition) one is trained primarily as a civilian or as a
common lawyer. The narrative is therefore told as either one of passive virtues (we stand
at the gate and allow the other to influence our own legal tradition) or one of aggressive
resistance (we stand aloof and reject the others as antiquated or barbaric given our
predisposition). To be sure there is no natural affinity between the two. And it is
undeniable that systems do from time to time borrow from one another, despite the
1

See generally, WILLIAM MCNEIL, PURSUIT OF POWER: TECHNOLOGY, ARMED FORCE,
AND SOCIETY SINCE AD 1000 (1982).

perception that each remains superior to its counterpart.2 Such is the premise behind
comparative law.3 The more politically friendly version tends to suggest a developing
third family of legal tradition known for the combination of civilian and common law
themes; that jurisdictions are becoming multi-traditional, mixed, or “bijural”.4
The danger in creating a “new legal tradition” from the relics of traditions is it
tends to devalue the traditions that supposedly have been combined. So, when Palmer
writes that “because of their double genetic makeup mixed jurisdictions must appear
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See e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common law and Economic Growth: Hayek might be
right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506-07 (2001) (arguing that the common law is more
predictable than the civil law system because of its respect for precedents and the power
of its appellate courts); Pierre LeGrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal
Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 58 (1999) (Pierre LeGrand in a dialogue with
John Henry Merryman explains the preference one has for either civil law or common
law theory).
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“There does not exist in the modern world a pure judicial system formed without
exterior influence.” ARMINJON, NOLDE, & WOLFF, TRAITE DE DROIT COMPARE 49 (1950)
(Trans. in VERNON PALMER, LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 4
(1999). The observation that one system of law derives essentially from the institutions
that can be attributed to it (or in Palmer’s case a combination of certain institutions)
ignores the truism that comparative law cannot be simply reduced to an evaluation of
similarities and differences: such analysis ignores relevant social, political, moral and
economic values that more proximately determine the legal course of a jurisdiction. See
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 4 (1974). In that sense, Merryman’s conclusion
that legal “traditions” are more appropriately considered over legal systems” reflects the
well thought out conclusion that law tends to reflect “deeply rooted, historically
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in society,” about the
institutions of the law, and about how law is to come about. See JOHN MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (1969).
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MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION (1999) (collecting essays from various fields to
illustrate the tension that exists in a “mixed jurisdiction”); THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN
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of essays by palmer relating to Louisiana’s dual nature through time and various code
reforms); MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY (2001)
(Palmer’s Magnum Opus on mixed jurisdictions). Of Course, Palmer is not alone; The
2003 edition of the Tulane Law Review collected numerous articles for a symposium
entitled 2003 First Worldwide Congress on Mixed Jurisdictions.

anomalous (and unclassified) when compared to one of their two parents,”5 he tells us
that the two traditions cease to exist in the shadow of the third. Said another way, the
“new legal system” becomes an orphan, unsure whether its institutions and enabling
devices derive from one system or anther. Thus in the same way that comparative law
runs the risk of exaggerating the origins of differences,6 creating a new legal family
where there really is none risks isolating legal systems to the point of losing tradition. To
be sure, Louisiana has never thought of itself as alone in the sense that Palmer would
suggest that it is; it has also never thought of itself aligned with the various lists of other
“mixed jurisdictions” opposed to being aligned by civilian values.7
Instead, like other legal systems that share legal traits between multiple systems, it
has continued to consider itself characterized by a dominant persuasion – Louisiana is a
Civilian jurisdiction. This is not surprising; legal systems continue to retain a dominant
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See Palmer supra note ___, at 7.
See Alan Watson, supra note ___, at 4:
Comparative law cannot be primarily a matter of drawing
comparisons. Those who would disagree with this
proposition proceed from one of two starting points. They
may start from an individual legal problem they consider to
be the same in more than one jurisdiction and examine the
legal response to it. As one scholar has put it, “The fact
that the problem is one and the same warrants the
comparability. Or they may take a branch of law, say
Contract, and investigate in detail the differences and
similarities of the individual rules. But it is very doubtful if
the comparisons are justifiable in academic terms as
comparative law, whether the starting point is the legal
problem or the branch of law. Variations in the political,
moral, social, and economic values which exist between
any two societies make it hard to believe that many legal
problems are the same for both except on a technical level.
7
Palmer’s family of “mixed jurisdictions” includes South Africa, Scotland, Louisiana,
Quebec, Puerto Rico, The Philippines, and Israel. See PALMER, WORLDWIDE, supra note
___.
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legal tradition that is unmitigated, though phenomenon appears that does not derive from
the dominant tradition. Said slightly differently, there is a nomos to legal traditions in
much the same way that there is a nomos to specific legal cultures – an aura that
transcends the institutions that make up the tradition. That nomos includes the stories we
tell about ourselves -- the ways we perceive our institution interacting with others, and
the insulation of our traditions against the traditions we deem contrary or destructive to
our own.
It also includes hintsthat recognize the corpus of the dominant tradition as being
superior to the secondary tradition;8 simply put, we prefer the legal institutions we grow
familiar with. I remember my first year torts professor reminding us civilian students that
the Barbarians in our class (the common law students) were indeed engaging in
8

See Legrand, supra note ___, at 58.
PL: As you yourself observe, there is, despite the deficits
you identify, a feeling among many civilians that the civil
law tradition is "superior" to the common law. Why this
sentiment? Would it suggest that there is less receptivity
toward alterity in the civil law than in the common law?
JHM: I came to this conclusion by reading the work of civil
law lawyers. There are passages making it very clear that
they find a sophistication in the civil law that they do not
see anywhere else. They regard the common law as
relatively crude and undeveloped. If you accept their idea
of what constitutes superiority--the emphasis on hard-edged
concepts, system, abstraction, and all that--I see what they
are saying.
PL: Have you encountered the same feeling of superiority
in your common law colleagues vis-à-vis the civil law?
JHM: Of course, at least among American lawyers. But the
values on which they hang their idea of superiority are
completely different: there is the belief that the common
law is more functional, more efficient, and so on. Having
said this, I think that the feeling of superiority is stronger in
the civil law. One of the things that bothers a lot of civil
law lawyers about the common law is that they can not find
it. They do not know where it is.

barbarism of the common law – fighting one another in courts to determine what the law
was. We needed no contest of strength to know the law; we had the law and it was held
in a central Civil Code – as sacred as the Bible and as wise as the ancients. Even now, as
a scholar that engages more common lawyers than I do civilians, my mind often times
wonders and visualizes the superior legal training I received versus the vile combat these
poor fellows must engage in on a regular basis. It is the vision of the noble savages
battling for the law, as the civilized world sits smugly, watching their efforts, while
holding the cannon in its hands – the precious Civil Code.
But even by my description of the smugness that derives from certain preference
judgments within the civilian and common law traditions, thenomos begins to be
revealed. Some have suggested that the civil law suffers from a superiority belief.9 In
Louisiana, in recent years, that belief has come under siege. The perceptions that the
Louisiana Civil Law has much to learn from its common law neighbors, at least within
certain legal fields, seems to be growing in popularity. But much of this discussion has
also become diluted. Instead of focusing on systems, the analysis has turned towards
institutions within systems. We don’t say the civil law system is superior. Rather, we
now talk in turns of the superiority of civil law property systems, the sales code, or family
law.10 Let me give two examples from the recent past.
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See John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969); see also supra note 8.
Of course, historic reasons could account for this distinction. Joseph Dainow noted the
following:
The Civil Law in Louisiana is not the whole legal system
but only those parts contained in the Civil Code, namely
the law of persons and the family, property successions,
and donations, obligations and the various private contracts
(most important of which are sale and lease), the security
devices of pledge and suretyship as well as privileges and
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At the 2002 Tucker Lecture, my friend Kathy Lorio asked the question “is
Louisiana’s civil law archaic or prophetic.”11 It seems that during the drastic changes to
the Louisiana law of successions in the 1990’s,12 the Reporter for the Louisiana Law
Institute developed the obnoxious habit of referring to certain institutions as “Archaic,”
ultimately memorializing that commentary in the official comments to the Code.13
Comments such as these annoyed the persons that saw the civil law, not as archaeic, but
as a timeless system that defined persons, their property, and their transactions. Kathy
was one of those persons and wrote passionately about civil law institutions that could be

mortgages, plus the acquisitive and liberative prescriptions.
In a civil law country, the so-called civilian method of
thinking and the civilian techniques are considered as
characterizing also the nature and development and
interpretation of other areas of that country’s legal
system…
Joseph Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana Law for
Comparative Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 175, 176 (1961).
11
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or Prophetic in
the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 2 (2003).
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I call the move drastic, not as a negative connotation, but because of its breadth and
scope. The changes to the laws of successions and donations in the 1990’s were certainly
dramatic, as seen by the amount of law review crescendo that the changes wrought:
seee.g., Cynthia Ann Samuel, The 1997 Successions and Donations Revision: A critique
in honor of A.N. Yianapoulos, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1999); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The
New Forcd Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable “Revolution,” 50 LA. L. REV. 409
(1990); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Aftermath of the “Revolution,” 51 LA. L. REV. 469
(1991); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable “Revolution”
Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55 (1996); Katherine Connell-Thouez, The New Forced
Heirship in Louisiana: Historical Perspectives, Comparative Law Analyses and
Reflections upon the Integration of new structures into a classical Civil Law System, 43
LOY. L. REV. 1 (1997); Ronald J. Scalise, The Chaos and Confusion of Modern
Collation: A Critical Look into an institution of Louisiana Succession Law, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 411 (2000); see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Changing Face of Forced
Heirship: A New Louisiana Creation, in Palmer, Louisiana supra note ____, at 181.
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See LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTS 941 official comment ( ); 951 official comment ( );
and 1616 ( ). The summary of archaic provisions is provided by Mr. Nathan in his
Introduction to the New Louisiana Law of Successions in THE CIVIL CODE (2003) .
Additionally, the law of partnership article summarizes the rention of provisions deemed
archaic at various times and circumstances.

deemed as more contemporary than ancient. During that same event, Professor Patrick
Martin of Louisiana State University stood up and addressed the audience and proudly
proclaimed in effect, “I believe that the rest of the nation could learn from the Louisiana
Civil Law approach to property.”
Kathy’s approach and (Professor Martin’s on a larger scale), focused on the
institutions of the civil law to show they have a place in the dialogue of law. Their
comments were to this effect: “The Civil Law is superior because x manifestation is
better than the common law Y.” This rubric seems misplaced to me, though I sympathize
with their reactions. Exchanging the corpus of the tradition for the institutional preference
compromises the essence of the civilian tradition itself.

It says, in effect, the institutions

instead of the inherent characteristics of the Civilian Tradition (the nomos) become more
definitive towards the civil law tradition. Kathy (and others) are asking what does it
mean to be a civilian jurisdiction in tension with its common law surroundings. And one
answer to that question is that being civilian means looking civilian. That is, we know
we are a civilian jurisdiction because we have institutions like forced heirship and
community property among other things that can be derived from our civilian heritage;
our imagination has become confined to a rubric that says “we are what we look like.”
Taken as a simple statement “we are what we look like” is a truism, correct and
timeless; it forms the basis of what this article is about – we really are what we look like,
or rather, we are what we imagine that we look like. I want to suggest that being civilian
is less about institutional appearance and more about the nomos of the civil law. That is,
the civil law is not definable by institutions, as institutions are temporary place holders
within the tradition. Rather, like so many other things, the Louisiana Civil Law is

defined usually by the perceptions we draw regarding what we “should look like.” Mere
institutional appearance on the other hand does not tell us what to do with legal
innovations that have no root in either the civil or common law traditions. And for this
reason, an institutional appearance cannot be the basis for locating a tradition, though it
can be an identifier. Let me state this using the forced heirship example. One could
argue from the forced heirship debate that the civilian tradition was well thought out,
designed to protect family, and was a built in mechanism to limit dependency on the state
for maintenance of individuals; accordingly, its deep rooted tradition in Louisiana and the
French Civil Codes is justified by the policy reasons that support its continuance.14 One
could also, plausibly argue today, that the transmogrification of forced heirship from a
guarantee of family legacies to a protection for minor children and incapacitated adults is
now the commodity of the civilian tradition on forced heirship because it serves the
purpose of protecting vulnerable persons while preserving the individual autonomy of
choice.15 Both are sound policy arguments that warrant deep and sober reflection. The
former, though carries an intrinsic quality of tradition that seems out of place when
evaluating legal policy.
Moreover, the civil law tradition cannot be reduced to simply a distinction that we
have statutes and codes. Let me provide another example. In 1962 the Louisiana
Supreme Court adopted a new methodology for deciding torts negligence cases, called
the Duty Risk Analysis.16 The traditional civilian analysis requires a showing of “fault”
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The Court began its Duty Risk Analysis trend in a case called Dixie Drive it Yourself
v. American Beverage Company, 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962). A recent case,
Pepper v. Triplet, 864 So.2d 181 (La. 2004) (creating a doctrine of strict liability that is

before delict liability attaches.17 The duty risk analysis therefore splits the elements
required to prove fault into four distinct elements – cause, duty, breach and damages –
and engages in a policy analysis in evaluating their application.18 One might well
conclude with Professor Vernon Palmer that this is merely a wolf in sheep’s clothing;
though the conclusion may retain a civilian root – fault – its antecedent (the breach of
duty) is purely an American common law innovation.19
What Palmer brushes by, however, is the type of analysis undertaken by judges
applying this Duty Risk Analysis. Indeed, the analysis undertaken by judges is a policy

an amalgamation of civil law and American tort law). The duty risk analysis was
spawned by policy oriented academics such as Wex Malone and Leon Greene. Leon
Greene, Rationales of Proximate Cause 11-13 (1927); Wex Malone, Ruminations on
Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970).
17
See La. C.C. art. 2315 (“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”).
18
See Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty Risk Analysis, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1227, 1233-34 (1984):
The general consensus is that six identifiable
socioeconomic considerations influence the decision of
whether the defendant owed a legal duty to a particular
plaintiff not to create this specific risk of harm by the
precise conduct which the court has already concluded was
a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Obviously, there is
interplay among these factors as the judge ponders his
decision. As a practitioner, the writer wishes that every
judge would tape these six considerations to his wrist like a
quarterback so that, when he has a visceral feeling as to
who should win, he can at least check off each of these
elements to determine exactly why he approves the position
of one side or another and at the same time make sure he
has not overlooked an important consideration. These six
factors are: (1) ease of association, (2) administrative
considerations, (3) economic considerations, (4) moral
considerations, (5) type of activity, and (6) precedent or
historical considerations.
19
See Vernon Palmer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-Cultural Setting: The
Tort Experience of Louisiana, 46 LOY. L. REV. 535, 566 (2000) (“in the formulation of
the question of negligent wrongfulness, Louisiana is, as far as I can see, in the
mainstream of American Common Law, not the Civil Law.”).

analysis – the very analysis that renders legislation superior to decisions and that under
girds the essence of a civilian approach to law.20

The Duty Risk analysis begins with

the Civilian requirement for fault, interposes the questions of duty and cause, and invokes
a policy analysis in its solution. Palmer’s assumption that institutions “compare” and
therefore assimilate misses the truly civilian work being undertaken by the Supreme
Court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s use of the Duty Risk Analysis tracks several
fundamental viewpoints by which Louisiana jurists view themselves. First, Duty Risk
analysis starts and ends in the Code. Professor Crawford’s comments, noting the scarcity
of code provisions in the area of delict emphasize that the judicial role is one of
interpretation, first, last, and throughout:
The Codal texts governing delict are so spare and general
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the
tort law with its own pen, though it is done in the name of
interpretation. The Civil Code requires the court to resort
to justice, reason, and prevailing usages. Both Gény and
Planiol support the theory that it is right and necessary for
the court to resort to its own mind and conscious to write
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See WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW § 1.11 at 21
(2000).
According to strict civil law theory, legislation is the law
and judicial opinion is only an interpretation thereof. The
functional result of the axiom of jurisprudence constante is
not unlike the function effect of the common law doctrine
of stare decisis, which mandates the court to remain faithful
to the earlier decisions that establish a rule of law. Under
the Civilian notion, the interpretation of the legislation
must also remain consistent.
I might also remind Professor Palmer that Louisiana judges are elected; many times their
function is as much legislative as it is judicial. Of course, he might also remind me that
so too are many common law judges. Nevertheless, the Louisiana judges certainly
appear more willing to apply policy concerns to matters as Professor Palmer himself
recognizes implicitly.

in detail the enormous superstructure or tort law that rests
upon the codal texts.21
Second, the decision to move towards Duty Risk Analysis and away from proximate
cause as a theory of liability indicates the state’s willingness to be distinct in its legal
institutions. In short, the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrated that the State’s identity
as unique amongst its forty-nine sister states empowers, not limits its ability to interpret
the state’s law.

***
All of this goes to infer that “we inhabit a Nomos.”22 As Robert Cover famously
“uncovered” for us in the 1980’s, law’s nomos is tethered to the narratives that are told
about it:
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex
normative world. The tradition includes not only a corpus
juris, but also a language and a mythos –narratives in which
the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it.
These myths establish the paradigms for behavior. They
build relations between the normative and the material
universe, between the constraints of reality and the
demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of
moves – a lexicon of normative action – that may be
combined into meaningful patterns culled from the
meaningful patterns of the past. The normative meaning
that has inhered in the patterns of the past will be found in
the history of ordinary legal doctrine at work in mundane
affairs; in utopian and messianic yearnings, imaginary
shapes given to a less resistant reality; in apologies for
power and privilege and in the critiques that may be
leveled in the justificatory enterprises of the law.23
Our Louisiana Nomos is distinct, its French, and it has a Code.

21

Id.
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Our Nomos is distinctive from other states. The Supreme Court’s willingness to
part with its sister states in the area of proximate cause was empowered by a
consciousness that embraced the uniqueness of Louisiana law. Without such a
perception, our legal system would be civilian in name only, having shed any and all
likenesses of our Civil Law system.
Our Nomos is French. The French connection in Louisiana has deep roots. Our
first civil code was in French with an English translation.24 Even if the original code
contained a stronger Spanish influence, its French nature still transcended the
document.25 Moreover, the Louisiana law institute undertook three major translation
projects of notable French Authors: in 1959, after nearly twenty five years of planning,
the Law Institute produced in English, Marcel Planiol’s, Traité Élémentaire de Droit
Civi, titled simply as Planiol Civil Law Treatise.26 Six years later, the institute unveiled
its English Translation of Charles Aubry’s Cours de Droit Civil Francais. Four years
after that, it produced François Geny’s Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé
positif.
The driving force behind these projects was a recognition that there was an
intimate relation between Louisiana law and French law, even if not always exactly the
same. The forward to the Planiol treatise states:
Louisiana, a civil law state, with a Civil Code based on the
Code Napolean, has relied heavily in the past upon the
writings of the French legal scholars for the doctrinal
interpretation and consistent development of a code of
general law. Although one hundred fifty years have passed
24

La. Civil Code (1808).
Dainow, supra note ___, at 177.
26
For a description of the process undertaken in approving the project and the obstacles,
see Dainow, supra note, at 178.
25

since the adoption of the Code of 1808, Louisiana has
produced no commentary on its Civil Code as a whole, and
only a few of the subjects covered thereby have been
discussed in any work that properly might be called a
treatise. Within the last generation of Law Reviews which
were established at the Louisiana State, Loyola, and Tulane
Universities have done much to answer the need for
objective discussions of the provisions of the Code in the
light of their underlying philosophy and historical
development. Nevertheless, the great wealth of material of
this nature can still be found only in the French
Commentaries. In the early days under the Civil Code
these commentaries were, in effect, Louisiana doctrine, for
the French language was then used to a very considerable
extent by the legal profession. But with the passing of the
years its use has continued to decline, as has likewise the
number of Louisianaians sufficiently schooled in French to
be able to avail themselves readily of French doctrinal
materials. On the other hand, the succession of time has not
lessened to any appreciable extent the importance of such
discussions to the legal profession in Louisiana.
Louisiana’s law reports and other legal writings give ample
positive evidence of how we can profit from the writings of
the French, and there is no lack of evidence of a negative
sort, that a more complete knowledge of such materials
might have been a source of great illumination to us in
many cases. Of the 2281 articles in the Code Napoleon,
approximately 1800 are contained in full or in part in the
Louisiana revised Civil Code of 1870. By far the greatest
number appear in our Code without change in substance.27

Finally, our Nomos is identified by our Code. The very first values we pass on to
succeeding generations is the importance of the Code. The Code is important because it
defines who we are, what we have, and how we use it. In the words of Colonel John
Tucker, the Code is the
most important book in your library,… because it ushers
you into society as a member of your parent’s family and
regulates your life until you reach maturity. It then
prescribes the rules for the establishment of your own
27

J. Denson Smith, Forward, in PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE at 3 (1959).

family by marriage and having children, and for the
disposition of your estate when you die, either by law or by
testament, subject to law. It tells you how you can acquire,
own, use and dispose of property onerously or gratuitously.
It provide the rules for most of the special contracts
necessary for the conduct of nearly all of your relations
with your fellowmen: sales, loans (with or without
security), leases, usufructs, and servitudes; and finally, all
of the rights and obligations governing your relations with
your neighbor and fellowman generally.28
The Code prevented the Louisiana Law Institute from adopting the Uniform Commercial
Code in 1967. It also required certain large scale revisions in 1870 following the most
significant reclassification of persons and property in modern history: the mandated
ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment changed more than
the state of race relations, but completely reorganized social relations and property
regimes. In Louisiana, that reorganization started in the Code. The Code captivates our
attention in Louisiana, perhaps because it is so logical. It is also a part of what identifies
us as Louisiana Lawyers.
Principally, we know the Nomos and its features by the stories we tell. Law is as
much about the stories that are told in the past – the formative narratives as it is about the
hungering for the future – “the messianic yearnings.”

In a certain sense then, Kathy’s

title mentioned above is exactly right: the arcane institutions of the past are bright
predictors for the future.
The narratives that are told tend to shape communities as well as legal norms. We
don’t live in isolation from one another. Rather a communal character inures to people
who share the same stories. No person is an island in a normative story – even those that
chose to recluse from social standards do so within the context of a shared story – one
28

John H. Tucker, Forward in A.N. Yianapoulos, Louisiana Civil Code, at XXI (2003).

they happen to reject but are still apart of. “The part that you or I choose to play may be
singular, but the fact that we can locate it in a common ‘script’ renders it ‘sane’ – a
warrant that we share a nomos.”29
One obvious inference then is that the Louisiana Civil Law tradition does not
exist in isolation from either its past or its future. Indeed a brief skimming of the latest
Louisiana Law Review, Tulane Law Review, or Loyola Law Review, will provide
undoubtedly an article in which the central theme is “ X law” is faithful to the civilian
tradition and should be continued; or that same law is either unique to the point of
embarrassment or to the point of supremacy and therefore should be changed to conform
with the rest of the states/ maintained as better than the common law alternatives. We are
constantly in the market of comparing the institutions we have against others dissimilar to
us to decide whether the tradition is better served by change or by remaining the same.
An even more obvious point is that the nomos naturalizes its institutions. That is,
the tradition can grow in ways that are different from its tradition but never without some
symbolic glance towards it. So, the Louisiana Law Institute’s decisions to publish
translations of the French treatises by Marcel Planiol, Charles Aubry and Rau, and
Charles Geny indicate if nothing else a passive reflection that at some deep point the
Louisiana narrative begins in French law; the substance of which some Louisiana
scholars have contested, but whose normative power they do not cross. Nevertheless, the
culture tells us that French sources are important even if the main body of the law reflects
other cultures. The language variance has the same effect: despite the fact that the Civil
Code was amended in 1973 to anglicize the third party contract, courts and lawyers still
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refer to stipulations pour autrui, though I dare say not many speak French.30 Similarly,
in Louisiana we have projets that consider changes to the Constitution, not projects or
reports. Thus, the nomos takes variations that otherwise would feel awkward and
unstable, and incorporates them as if they were a natural part of the institution.
All of these factors tend to be worked out by the narratives that help shape the
nomos. I offer two narratives that reveal the Nomos; there are certainly others. I chose
these two because they represent the collision of institutions and ideals. The first is the
narrative of the Code Noir and Louisiana slave law. The second narrative is the adoption
of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code in Louisiana. Both demonstrate
elements of the Nomos and how we begin to formulate an identity as a civilian state.
Part II
Louisiana Narratives
1.

Narrative No. 1 -- Louisiana Slavery and the Code Noir

Slavery came to Louisiana in the early eighteenth century, relatively later than the
rest of North America. Louisiana was colonized by the French in the early seventeenth
century, Reasons for the delay include the French preference for mining over agriculture;
the preference for using slavery for building infrastructure; and the fact that the driving
motivation for obtaining Louisiana was not economic but political: the French didn’t
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See e.g., Alexander v. Gary, 924 So.2d 428 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006); Barnhill v.
Remington Oil and Gas Corp., 918 So.2d 52 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005); Joseph Hospital
Service Distr. No. 2 of St. Mary Parish, 923 So.2d 27 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005) etc….
Indeed, since 1990 fifty four cases have used the term stipulation pour atrui in the place
of the anglicized “third party beneficiary contract.”

want the British to have it. 31 In fact, it was not until the Spanish gained the territory in
1763 did agricultural slavery begin to flourish in the colony.32
Despite the fact that the French were not committed to agricultural development
of the territory, slavery was still an institution desired by the French colonials. In 1704,
the colonists in Louisiana began petitioning the government for the introduction of slave
labor to clear the land.33 With the introduction of large numbers of slaves into the
territory, new laws had to be shaped to control the slavery system. Thus, in 1724, the
Code Noir was introduced into the vast French colony.34 The Code Noir regulated
everything touching the institution of slavery, including religion,35 nourishment and
care,36 control,37 prosecution,38 status,39 seizure, and emancipation of African slaves. The
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GRADY KILMAN, SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR IN COLONIAL LOUISIANA 1699-1803,
10 (1972).
32
France claimed the Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century, and held the
territory until the end of the Seven Year’s War. Then, in 1763, France ceded to Spain the
vast territory -- first by secretive agreement, and then officially in the Treaty of Paris.
King Louis XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21, 1764 of the
ceding of the Louisiana Territory to Spain. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, HISTORY OF
LOUISIANA 92-93 (1882).
33
Id.
34
The 1724 Code Noir was specific to Louisiana, though its antecedent was a 1685
Codification designed for French Possessions in the West Indies. See Vernon Valentine
Palmer, The Origins and Authors of the French Code Noir, 56 LA. L. REV. 363, 367
(1995); Hans W. Baade, The Gens de Couleur in Louisiana: Comparative Slave Law in
Microcosm, 18 CARDOZA L. REV. 535, 541 (1996).
35
See Code Noir arts. 2-5; id. art. 11. The author in a previous piece described the
relation of the Code Noir to the revolutionary atmosphere surrounding the territory. In
that piece, notable cases applying the articles of the Code Noir are cited. See Marc L.
Roark, Louisiana Colonial Slavery Law – Revolution, Property and Race (Copy on file
with Author).
36
See Code Noir arts. 18-21.
37
See Code Noir arts. 25-28.
38
Id.
39
See e.g., Re Indian, 4 La. Hist. Q. 355 (1729)( “Petition for emancipation: ‘Duplesis,
settler at Natchitoches, holds a ‘kind of will’ … by late François Viard, who freed an
osage woman slave and reserved 100 pistoles in behalf of her catholic

Code Noir remained the central piece of slavery legislation even after the French lost
control of the territory. 40 It is this code – the Code Noir – that became the lasting legal
force behind the slavery laws. Like the civil code’s “ushering” of persons into society,
the Code Noir specifically exempted a certain class of persons from society,41 and
directed their affairs in much the same pattern as the Civil Code.
The Code Noir was introduced into the Louisiana territory in 1725. Over the
course of one hundred and fifty years it was altered and amended regularly but continued
to maintain the corpus of its organization. For example the initial Code Noir was divided
into seven parts: Religion; Clothing and Nourishment; Police; Crimes and Punishments;
Witnesses, Donations, Successions, and Actions; Legal Seizures, Slaves as Movable
Property; and Grants of Liberty.42 When a new “black code” was desired, the drafters
turned to the former Code Noir as a model.43 While retaining many of the substantive
provisions of the previous Code Noir, the new code was divided into two primary
sections: (1) general provisions; and (2) crime and punishment.44

instruction….Attorney General approves emancipation… but the black code forbids cash
legacies to a slave.”).
40
The Code Noir was revested in 1769, after O’Reilly assumed control of the territory.
Hans W. Baade, The Spanish Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana 1769-1803, in THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH
PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803, Vol. II 371 (1996) (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg.
2543 f. 195 (available on microform from Loyola University, New Orleans).
41
While the Civil Code told persons how to own property, the Code Noir specifically
exempted slaves from property ownership. In the Code Noir, the slaves were the
property. Thus its regulations were not empowering but rather inapplicable. Both codes
regulated marriage and children.
42
See Palmer, Authors and Sources of the Original Code Noir, in Palmer CODIFICATION,
supra note ___, at 121.
43
See John T. Hood Jr., A Crossroad in Louisiana History, 22 LA. L. REV. 709, 711
(1962).
44
Compare 1725 Code Noir with 1806 Code Noir, in 1 LISLETT’S DIGEST 100-132.

Both versions of the Code Noir were designed to provide owners of slaves with
direction regarding every aspect of a slave’s life. The code’s purpose was holistic; that is,
it meant to treat every aspect of slavery by reference to a single compendium of laws.
But the stories we tell about the Code Noir demonstrate that it was as much a civil code
of slavery as it was a collection of laws.
While the fact that the compendium of laws regulating one area were
encompassed in one complete code certainly suggests a similarity to the civil code,45 the
use of the Code Noir as a source for the later civil code of 1806 serves as more
compelling evidence of its civilian character, regardless of how modest that role was.
Amongst other sources, the Code Noir served to create a source of instruction for the
territorial reorganization of its laws and structure. 46 Previously, the Code Noir served as
a source for the infamous O’Reilly’s Code under Spanish Provincial rule. 47
The decision to include provisions into a code is a matter of contemporary
judgment, reflecting the currents of the time. But the decision whether such inclusions
reflect faithful decisions are issues of reflection that appear most contestable from afar.
Notably, no one contends or contended that the Code Noir was anything but a civilian
extension to the law of slavery. From its structure to its sources, the civilian character
transcends the Code Noir.
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See David Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51 LOY. L. REV. 57
(2005).
46
Vernon Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish Perception: Historical
Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63
La. L. Rev. 1067, 1073 n.13 (2003). In addition to the Code Noir, other sources included
were the Las Siete Partidas, Febrero, the Institutes, Blackstone, Justinian's Digest, Curia
Philipica, Gaius, the Fuero Real, the Ordinances of Bilbao, and local Louisiana statutes.
Id.
47
Vernon Palmer, French Connection supra note ___, at 1155.

What we do debate, however, is whether the Code Noir’s sources are purely
French or reflect other traditions. As we discussed above, this transcends through
language and institutions that have long sense left the ordinary usage of social
construction, but which retain significance in the legal identity of the state. Nowhere is
this story more contested than with regards to the nature of slave laws in Louisiana. That
is, no one contests that the laws were civilian; rather, the issue that has been debated is a
question of which civilian character: French, Spanish, or Roman.
The crux of the story requires a brief description of the historical facts relating to
the transfer of the territory from France to Spain and then back to France again. France
claimed the Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century, and held the territory until
the end of the Seven Year’s War.48 Then, in 1763, France ceded to Spain the vast
territory -- first by secretive agreement,49 and then officially in the Treaty of Paris.50 King
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FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 92-93 (1882). The Seven Years
War, also called the French and Indian War pitted France against Britain primarily, but
also involved Spain, the American Colonies, and the Native Americans.
49
See Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain (“Treaty of Fontainebleau”),
November 3, 1762, Fr.-Sp., 42 CONSOL. TREATY SERIES 239, 241. Scholars have offered
several viable reasons for French cession of Louisiana to Spain include the unloading of
an economic drain from the French economy, the compensation for Spanish loss of
Florida in the Seven Years War, and even a pre-orchestrated bargained for exchange for
Spain’s alliance against Britain in the same war. See Author S. Aiton, The Diplomacy of
the Louisiana Cession in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA
HISTORY: THE SPANISH PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803 VOL. II, 23 (1996).
50
See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain and Spain, Signed at
Paris (“Treaty of Paris”), February 10, 1763, GB, Fr. & Sp., 42 CONSOL. TREATY SERIES
279, 324. Interestingly, the Treaty of Paris does not cede Louisiana to Spain directly.
Rather, the treaty’s significance is the securing of France’s possession in Louisiana to
validate the earlier transfer by the Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain.
The Treaty of Paris only draws a line of separation in the Americas between French and
British possessions. Id. §VII, at 325-26.

Louis XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21, 1764 of the ceding of
the Louisiana Territory to Spain.51
On March 5, 1766, the first Spanish Governor, Don Antonio de Ulloa, arrived in
New Orleans and established Spanish provincial rule.52

Ulloa maintained French

political structures, even issuing his orders through the French Commandant Phillip
Aubrey. Those that resided in the territory, particularly those of Creole descent,53 feared
that the new Spanish Administration would bring a complete denial of their rights as
colonists.54 Additionally, the French colonists felt betrayed by their King as mere pawns
of politics. The French colonists envisioned not only the present loss of country but the
potential loss of property.55 Gayarre, a Louisiana historian, summarizes succinctly the
French Colonial apprehensions of this transfer:
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See Letter from King Louis XV, King of France to Mr. D’Abbadie, Governor of
Louisiana (April 21, 1764) translated and reproduced in CHARLES E. GAYARRE, A
HISTORY OF LOUISIANA: FRENCH DOMINATION Vol. II, 109 - 111 (3d Ed. 1882).
52
Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards, Planters, and Slaves36 (1999).
53
At the time, Louisiana was composed of persons from Creole, English, and Spanish
decent. Indeed, the territory identified itself as French, though its people were from
varying nationalities. See CHARLES GAYARRÉ, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA : THE SPANISH
DOMINATION VOL. III 185 (1882).
54
Note that King Louis XV, somewhat presumes this inference in his Letter to Mr.
D’Abbadie and reassures the colonists that their property rights are secure. See Letter
from King Louis XV:
I hope …. that the titles of the inhabitants to their property
shall be confirmed in accordance with the concessions
made by the Governors and ordaining commissaries of said
colony…hoping moreover that his Catholic Majesty will be
pleased to give his subjects of Louisiana the marks of
protection and good will which they have been made more
effectual, if not counteracted by the calamities of war.
Id. at 185.
55
See CHARLES E. GAYERRE, supra note 9, at 113. Gayarre summarizes succinctly the
French Colonial apprehensions of this transfer:
As Frenchmen, they felt that a deep wound had been
inflicted on their pride by the severing in twain of

As Frenchmen, they felt that a deep wound had been
inflicted on their pride by the severing in twain of
Louisiana, and the distribution of its mutilated parts
between England and Spain. As men, they felt the
degradation of being bartered away as marketable objects;
they felt the loss of their national character and rights, and
the humiliation of their sudden transformation into
Spaniards or Englishmen without their consent. As
colonists, as property owners, as members of a civilized
society, they were agitated by all the apprehensions
consequent upon a change of laws, manners, customs,
habits and government.

Thus, in 1768, six hundred plantation owners and merchants sent a petition to the
Superior Counsil asking that Governor Ulloa be expelled from the territory, and that
certain rights and liberties be restored.56 Governor Ulloa was removed, and, at least
temporarily, the colonists believed that repatriation was in their future. Those hopes were
short lived. Spain responded by replacing the removed Governor Ulloa with Governor
Alejandro O’Reilly. O’Reilly acted swiftly to punish insurgents and restore Spanish rule.
One of the first acts of Governor O’Reilly was to replace the French legal structures with
a visibly Spanish presence.57

Specifically, O’Reilly dissolved the Superior Council

believing it to be a tool of the colonists towards insurrection.58

Louisiana, and the distribution of its mutilated parts
between England and Spain. As men, they felt the
degradation of being bartered away as marketable objects;
they felt the loss of their national character and rights, and
the humiliation of their sudden transformation into
Spaniards or Englishmen without their consent. As
colonists, as property owners, as members of a civilized
society, they were agitated by all the apprehensions
consequent upon a change of laws, manners, customs,
habits and government.
56

Id.
See Gustavus Schmidt, Ordinances of Don Alexander O’Reilly, 1 LA. L. J. 1 (1841)
(translating three orders of Governor O’Reilly relating to the substitution of French Law
57

From the start, the Spanish were viewed with disdain by French settlers who
continued to resonate more with the mére patrie than they did with their colonial
governors.59 O’Reilly’s punishment of the insurrectionists of 1768 didn’t ease the
tension as French-Louisianaians referred to him as “Bloody O’Reilly,” a practice that
continued long after his rule as Governor ceased.60 But just as French citizens did indeed
prefer the mother country to Spanish provincial rule, those feelings were clearly more
nationalistic. Indeed, the Spanish did more to assist colonists in creating a viable
Louisiana economy. And Spain was sensitive to the French people’s desire for their
mother country as long as that sensitivity did not spread to insurrection. A 1779 and
1782 trade cédula, which permitted direct commerce between France and Louisiana
seemed to placate French citizens and temper reactions against the Spanish.61
Relating to slavery, O’Reilly continued the enforcement of the Code Noir,
expressing “admiration for [the Code’s] “wisdom and piety.”
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The question that has

been debated most recently is whether the Code Noir continued a French version of rule
or whether it was supplanted by a Spanish version. A follow-up question seeks to
uncover the normative value of the Code Noir.

for Spanish Law and structure, enacted and published in French November 25, 1769); see
also KATE WALLACH, BIBLIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SOURCES
ROMAN, FRENCH, AND SPANISH 67 (1955).
58
Hereinafter, the article will refer to the Superior Council simply as “the Council.”
59
Ernest R. Liljegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana, 22 LA. HIST. Q. 47, 49 (1939).
60
Id. at 47.
61
Id.
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Hans W. Baade, The Spanish Law of Slavery in Spanish Luisiana 1769-1803, in THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH
PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803, Vol. II 371 (1996) (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg.
2543 f. 195 (available on microform from Loyola University, New Orleans).

To the first, Hans Baade has pointed to several provisions of Alfonso el Sabio’s
Siete Partidas63 that, though sharing a common Roman heritage, did not enter the French
Code Noir of 1724.64 For example the Siete Partidas included a provision that declared
slavery as contrary to “natural reason.”65

Similarly, under traditional Spanish law,

“slaves were entitled to file complaints of cruelty against their masters,” and were entitled
to judicial sale when cruelty was established.66 Baade points to these early provisions as
a source of more favorable treatment towards slaves by Spanish law then French; indeed,
citing to the Informe, Baade notes that the Spanish perceived that in “modern times,
slaves received ‘incomparably milder’ treatment in Spanish overseas possessions than in
the American colonies of France, England or the Netherlands” built around a “more
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Literally translated the “Seven Departures,” the Siete Partidas was compiled in 1265
by King Alfonso X, and governed peninsular Spain. See Dylan O. Drummond, The Rule
of Capture in Texas -- Still so misunderstood after all these years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1, 31 (2004). See also David Grunning, Mapping Society through Law: Louisiana Civil
Law Recodified, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 4 (2004) (discussing the role of the Siete
Partidas in the Louisiana Civil Law tradition).
64
See Baade, supra note 12, at 368.
65
See THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, Part IV Title 21, at 581 (Trans. L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton) (1820)
(“Slavery is a condition and state of things established anciently by nations, by which
men who were naturally free, are made slaves, and put under the dominion of others,
contrary to natural reason.”). See also Baade supra note 55, at 368.
66
See SIETE PARTIDAS supra note 59, Law 6, at 584:
We likewise say that if a man be so cruel to his slaves, as to
cause them to die of hunger, or strike or chastise them so
severely with the whip, that they cannot bear it; they may
then complain to the judge, who ought, in virtue of his
office, to enquire into the truth of the facts, and if he finds
them to be so, he ought to sell the slaves, and give the price
to their master. And this ought to be done in such a
manner, that the slaves shall never again come under the
power or dominion of the person , by whose fault they were
sold.
See also Baade, supra note 55, at 368

favorable ratio of freedman to slaves in Spanish possessions.”67 As Spain gained control
of the territory, some of these incidents became incorporated into the Louisiana slave
laws. Baade argues that the Spanish laws of Castile soon replaced all law in Louisiana,
including the Code Noir.68 Baade’s contention is supported by Raphael Rabalais, who
concludes, among other things that the early Louisiana Courts cited Spanish codes more
than they did French codes, and cited French treatises more than they did Spanish
treatises, cited Spanish statutes more than French statutes.69 This approach was described
fully by Professor Rudolfo Batiza in the early 1970’s.70
The Baade/ Rabalais/ Batiza position is countered by A.N. Yianapoulos, who
argues that the Spanish laws were less than enforceable against a resilient French
population.
Nevertheless, there are indications of a strong attachment
by the French population to its own laws and customs.
Rather than adhering to the official Spanish legal system,
the French population frequently settled affairs
extrajudicially under French laws, customs, and usages.
This state of affairs continued until the retrocession of the
Louisiana territory to France on October 1, 1800, by the
Treaty of San Idelfonso. France did not assume sovereignty
67

Baade, supra note 55, at 368 (citing Informe del Consejo de Indias Acerca de la
observancia de la Real cedula de 31 de Mayo de 1789 sobre la educacion, trato y
ocupaciones de los escalvos, reprinted in J.A. Saco, Historiade la Esclavaitud de la Raza
Africana en el Nuevo Mundo y en special en los Paises Americo-Hispanos, 3 Vols
(Habana 1938).
68
However, consider a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion fifty-three years later which
references the proclamation issued by Governor O’Reilly continuing the Code Noir’s
effect in the territory. See Beard v. Poydras, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 348 (La. 1816) (“the French
Law, called the Code Noir… was in force in this country. To establish this, a
proclamation is produced, issued by Don Alessandro de O’Reilly, of the 27th of August,
1769, whereby it is continued in force.”).
69
Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and treatises on the Jurisprudence
of Louisiana 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1982).
70
See Rudolfo Batiza, The actual sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General
Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1978).

until November 20, 1803. During the twenty-day period of
French control, Pierre de Laussat, as colonial prefect for
Napoleon, abolished the Spanish authorities and established
a municipal government in Louisiana. There was not
sufficient time to organize a new legal system; Laussat's
only change in the law was the reintroduction of the French
code noir and the repeal of the Spanish slave legislation.
When the United States took possession of the Louisiana
territory on December 20, 1803, the bulk of the preexisting
laws were in force.71
Louisiana was a French Colony, with a French History. Of course what the citizens did
and what the Government enforced are oftentimes different questions; would the Courts
apply French law or Spanish law in the territory would seem to answer this debate.
Surprisingly, this did not seem to present the difficulty that one might expect. Palmer
notes:
O'Reilly had issued a proclamation that all proceedings in
civil and in criminal matters would be according to the laws
of Castille and of the Indies. By all accounts, this change of
substantive law did not have a great impact because of the
common origin, hence, the similarity of laws between
Spain and France. As a consequence, no noticeable
disruption occurred when the courts began applying the
new body of laws. Nevertheless, O'Reilly issued a decree in
1769 abolishing French law. It provided that thereafter the
laws in effect would be a compilation referred to as the
"Code O'Reilly." It was a combination which borrowed
from the Laws of the Indies, the Siete Partidas, and the
code noir. Although there were occasional adjustments of
the judicial structure and of the substantive laws of
Louisiana over the period of Spanish rule which lasted
some forty years, the basic form of the judicial system
remained unchanged.72
The sources of the laws may have been Spanish, but the colonial nomos was French.
***
71

A.N. Yianapoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 379, 382-83 (2003).
72
Vernon Palmer, French Connection supra note ___, at 1155.

There are principally two ways to address this narrative. One is purely historical,
That is, the legal scholar can engage the texts, identify the provisions that seem most
French, Spanish, or Roman, and argue vigorously that those texts create some
institutional identity for the territory. This has been the primary means of debate to this
point. 73 The Second way is to consider what that debate and the accompanying historical
facts have to say about the nature of Louisiana law. That is, can there be a nomos inside
this debate?
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Indeed both French and Spanish legal heritages derive from the Roman Civil Law
system. See Hans W. Baade, supra note 55, at 371. Much ink has been spilled (on many
many law review pages) regarding the debate whether the 1724 Code Noir reflected a
Romanist tradition or was a French Caribbean innovation. I take the position that the
Code Noir was a distinctly French scheme, but with distinct Romanist influences.
Compare Palmer supra note 47 (distinguishing several points of Roman Law from the
Code Noir); with Hans W. Baade, The Bifurcated Romanist Tradition of Slavery in
Louisiana, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1481, 1485 (1996) (maintaining a Romanist influence on the
Code Noir sources). See also Alan Watson, The Origins of the Code Noir Revisited, 71
TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (1997) (conceding the sources as Non-Roman, but also
reasserting certain Romanist influences). Nevertheless, the sources of the laws as French
Colonial or Roman make little difference to the ultimate disposition of this article.
From that Roman system of law (which also legislated rules for slavery), both the
French and Spanish laws regulating slavery were influenced substantially. For example,
Judith Schaffer draws the obvious connection between the Roman law of redhibition and
redhibtion allowed under the Code Noir. See e.g., ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW
(1987) & W.W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION OF THE
SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (2000). Both Watson and
Buckland’s treatments of Roman law slavery provide detailed analysis of the Roman laws
regulating the institution. Judith Kelleher Schafer, Roman Roots of the Louisiana Law of
Slavery: Emancipation in American Louisiana, 1803-1857, 56 LA. L. REV. 409, 409
(1995) (“The most important survival of Roman law in the law of slavery in Antebellum
Louisiana was the concept of redhibition.”). Another aspect of Roman slave law
transmogrified to the new world context was the notion of Obsequium or respect for
one’s former patron. See Justinian Digest 37:15.1-11. Though the tradition of showing
respect to your former master is traceable to Roman ancestry, the practice was mutated to
include respect for all white persons in the Code Noir of 1806. See Black Code art. 40
(“And it be further enacted that Free People of Color ought never to strike white people
nor presume to conceive themselves equal to the white; but on the contrary that they
ought to yield to them in every occasion and never speak nor answer to them but with
respect under the penalty of imprisonment according to the nature of the offense.”).

We have suggested that the nomos is identified by three factors. First the
prevalence of a Code centric debate. For example, the fact that the Code Noir is in a
structured Code certainly aids our argument. But even if it were not, other phenomenon
warrant the same conclusion. So for example, one could draw the conclusion that the
Code Noir’s past, the confusion regarding what legal institution was dominant, and the
need for order contributed to a Civil Code being adopted. Consider Roger Ward’s
argument:
Louisiana's decision to adopt a civil code was based on
necessity. Because of its motley colonial past, Louisiana's
legal system was actually an interesting amalgamation of
Spanish and French law. The Spanish law in effect at the
time of the transfer of the territory to the United States was
composed of eleven different codes, containing more than
20,000 laws, with many conflicting provisions. Relatively
few Spanish legal treatises were available to help
Louisianians understand and interpret these laws.
Likewise, remnants of French law such as the Customs of
Paris, Ordinance of 1667, Royal Edicts, and the code noir
were interspersed in the Spanish law governing the
territory.74
The Code Noir was certainly a part of this background – for better or worse.
We have also argued that there is a perception of distinctiveness that exists in
Louisiana. In the area of slave law, that norm has manifested itself towards making value
weight judgments of which system was more humane. For example, consider Vernon
Palmer’s argument:
The one constant of barbaric laws is that they did not seem
harsh to the barbarians. The Roman law of the talion--an
eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, etc.--originally seemed
equitable compared to the unlimited right of revenge that it
superseded. The talion introduced for the first time the
74

Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal Education: A
Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1283, 1302 (1997).

requirement of limited and proportionate response. The
Code Noir which the French monarch introduced into
Louisiana in 1724, was apparently a well-intentioned
attempt to ameliorate the condition of slaves. As there were
previously no controls governing how a master might treat
a slave, certain elements of enlightened society regarded
the Code Noir as humane and reformatory. Both the lex
talionis and the Code Noir however, are victims of moral
and historical relativism. These "improvements" will
always be scorned for the inequity they presupposed rather
than the incidental evils they suppressed.75
At times, our nomos of distinctiveness has caused those on the outside to also laud our
attempt to be human, in the face of owning humans. Consider Jonathan Bush’s reading of
the historical account:

“There were also no systematic slave codes in the English

colonies, in contrast to such other New World texts as the French Code Noir or the
Codigo negro caroleno of Santo Domingo. In short, whatever the timing and extent of
slavery in each English colony, at every step English colonial law seemed to take slavery
more or less for granted.”76 However, ultimately, we simply weren’t distinct enough:
The Louisiana code noir of Colonial times and the Black
Codes of the eighteen sixties; the pre-Civil War denial of
the vote to Negroes, even to wealthy and educated free men
of color; the ebb and flow of Negro rights in the
Constitutions of 1864 and 1868; the 1879 transfer of
political power from police juries and the legislature to the
Governor; the close election of 1892 and the 1896 victory
for white supremacy; the grandfather clause and the
complicated registration application form in the
Constitution of 1898; the invalidity of the grandfather
clause and the consequent resort to Mississippi's
understanding and interpretation clause; the effectiveness
of the white primary as a means of disfranchising Negroes;
the invalidity of the white primary and the consequent need
to revive enforcement of the interpretation test; the White
75
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League and the Citizens' Councils; the Black League and
the N.A.A.C.P.; the Battle of Liberty Place in 1874 and the
Ouachita voting purge of 1956--these are all related
members of a series, all reactions to the same dynamics that
produced the interpretation test and speak eloquently of its
purpose.77
As one commentator of Judge Wisdom noted,
it was necessary to view the interpretation test as part of
'the State's historic policy and the dominant white citizens'
firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state
and local government by denying to Negroes the right to
vote,' it was necessary to begin at the beginning. In the
beginning, as Judge Wisdom aptly noted, ' t here was, of
course, no problem.' There was 'no problem' because 'the
Code Noir, from the 1724 Code to Act 33 of the Territorial
Legislature of 1806, disfranchised Negroes.' Surveying the
constitutional developments embodied in the Louisiana
Constitutions of 1812, 1845, and 1852, Judge Wisdom
noted, with obvious pride in the history of his state, that the
latter two were 'progressive and broadly democratic
document s .' The Constitution of 1845 'did away with the
tax-paying qualification for voters and established universal
suffrage for free white males, regardless of wealth and
literacy.' The Constitution of 1852 'introduced registration
of voters, a progressive step many years in advance of most
states.' Despite the presence in Louisiana of many free
blacks, however, the franchise continued to be limited to
white males:
Thus, from the Code Noir of 1724 until 1864, the
organic law of the state ordained that only free white males
could vote or hold office. This was in a state where there
were thousands of free men of color. Many of these were
well educated and owned slaves. Except for suffrage, they
possessed the civil and legal rights of white citizens.78
And then there are the times our distinctiveness and its purposes became brutally honest
with one another – when our nomos became the source of our disappointment. Gayerre
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reflects on the nature of the Code Noir in the sparsely inhabited territory of early colonial
Louisiana:
This law is hard, but it is both wise and necessary in a land
of fifteen slaves to one white. Between the races we cannot
dig to deep a gulf. Upon the Negro, we cannot impress too
much respect for those he serves.
This distinction
rigorously upheld even after enfranchisement, if the surest
way to maintain subordination; for the slave must thus see
that his color is ordained to servanthood, and that nothing
can make him his master’s equal.79

Finally, the debate of sources demonstrates the importance of identity in Louisiana. We
are not just civilian. We are French Civilian even when the sources of laws indicate
otherwise.
2.

Narrative No. 2 – Revision of Security Rights
In 1990, Louisiana joined the other forty-nine states by adopting the Article 9

Secured Transactions provisions into its commercial law. (Louisiana has since referred to
the provisions as “Chapter 9” instead of Article 9 to “avoid confusion with the articles of
the Louisiana Civil Code”).80 This section, like the previous, is not a normative dialogue
of the virtues of Article 9 or their counterweight. Instead, it’s a narrative, like the first,
that exposes the norms of civilian culture in Louisiana law.
In 1967, the Louisiana Law Institute first considered what an adoption of Article 9
into the Louisiana Civil Law would look like. The report started like this:
In considering changes in Louisiana law the question
constantly arises whether the change is consistent with the
civil law. Yet there is little agreement as to what the term
“civil law” means. Civil law was once defined written law,
79
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but this definition is not helpful today because the common
law probably contains more written words than the civil
law. The volumes of reports and statutes that any commonlaw layer must use indicate that it too is written law. The
essence of civil law then may be not that it is written but
that it is written in codes, that is, that large areas of the law
are regulated, at least in their broad outlines, by systematic
statutes rather than by judicial opinions or fragmentary
statutes. This in turn leads to a methodology or way of
handling law which emphasizes the creativity of the
legislatures and the interpretive or interstices-filling
function of courts.
In accord with this analysis, it is tempting to say
that the Uniform Commercial Code is a civilian document
and the lack of system in the present Louisiana law of
secured transactions involving movables is uncivilian.
Louisiana may keep its uniqueness by being the only
common-law state in the area of commercial transactions.
However, another element should be introduced, namely
that by civil law is often meant a system, the substance or
at least the categories of which are descendents of Roman
law. German law before the code of 1900, Roman law
itself, and present South African law would be classified as
civil-law systems though not meeting modern standards of
codification. But even in the area of legal categories and
substance it is often hard to say that one idea is civilian and
another is not. The difference in substance between Roman
law and French law today probably exceeds the difference
between French and English law. There are also substantial
differences between modern German law and modern
French law. Further common law itself is permeated with
civilian concepts that have either been arrived at
independently or have been imported from continental law
through the courts of equity and cannon law. Thus to ask
whether a legal reform is consistent with civil law is at best
a vague question.81
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The report went on to describe the civilian roots of the then-current Louisiana security
devises,82 what an article nine transition might look like,83 and to recommend its adoption
because of the structure of the Uniform Commercial Code, the fact that the devises do not
differ greatly from traditional Louisiana law, and the commercial benefit of uniformity.84
In other words, the institute attempted to cast Article 9 as a civilian text, or at least one
that could be civilian with the right surroundings.85
Ultimately, Article 9 was rejected for more than twenty years as “incompatible
with the Louisiana Civil Code.”86 Then, in 1988 on the urging of Louisiana’s
commercial community, the Governor proposed the adoption of Article Nine and
appointed William Hawkland to chair a committee for the preparation of appropriate
82
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legislation.87 Hawkland’s committee found that four reasons justified adopting Article
Nine into Louisiana law: the need for uniformity, the need to reduce transaction costs
relating to obtaining security, the expansion of property types that would be classified as
security, and providing a greater certainty between state and federal regulation.88 Indeed,
Hawkland has received much praise for “finally bringing to [Louisiana] Article 9 of the
UCC.”89
Just as the Civil Law served as an analogue to justify Article 9’s adoption by the
Law Institute in 1967 (despite rejecting the whole), the Civil law would retain an
influence over the version that Hawkland would introduce. For example, several
provisions were changed from the “uniform” commercial code version that either
reflected civilian traditions or that did not offend the civil code provisions already in
place. Notably, the types of collateral were expanded while use of fixtures as collateral
was significantly restricted.90 These restrictions reflect a long-held tradition in Louisiana
law that a security interest cannot be attached to something that is already a fixture. The
change was necessary to honor not only notions of chattel mortgages present in the state,
but also the very distinction between movable and immovable property that under gird
the civil law property system in Louisiana.91 The alteration thus honored tradition and
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the Code while adopting a provision that mostly brings Louisiana into conformity with its
sister states.
The Civilian story transcended the adoption of UCC article 9. First the Law
Institute’s initial report caste Article 9, not as a common law vestige, but rather as a
provision that could be seen in common law terms. The fact that it was contained in a
Code and contained a systematic approach certainly aided that distinction. The ease of
trasition from traditional civilian tenets (with French and Roman roots) also was a strong
case. When Hawkland proposed his Article 9, the Legislature accepted its provisions
because it was not offensive to certain tenets of the civil law tradition.
This is the essential narrative that could be told. It embraces the civilian approach
to law. However, there is also a counter narrative. For example, consider one
commentator who reviewing the Louisiana Adoption of Article 9, concedes the
improvement, also notes that a part of the civilian character is lost:
Louisiana has adopted Article 9 of the U.C.C. That article
is among the best-known pieces of private law legislation
in the world, and needs no discussion here. I will confine
myself to three observations. One is that it does not extend
to immovables. The second is that it honours the publicity
principle, in the sense that nonpossessory security rights
cannot in general be “perfected” without registration
(filing). To that extent it is superior, I would suggest, to the
current Scots and South African law. The third observation
concerns the attachment/ perfection contrast which is
embedded in article 9. Is a “perfected security interest” a
“real right?” Presumably it is. Is an “attached,” but
unperfected security interest a real right? That is more
difficult. Either answer is a problem, for if it is a real right,
how does it differ from a personal right? The whole point
of a security right lies in its third party effect. Its effect “as
between the parties” is really no effect, for all the debtors
assets are in any case available to the creditor. As the
Louisiana Civil Code provides “whoever has bound himself
personally, is obliged to fulfill his engagements out of all

his property, movable and immovable, present and future.”
The U.C.C’s idea that there is something called
“attachment” whereby a security interest takes effect as
between the parties as distinct from “perfection” which
involves third-party effect, seems dubious from a civilian
standpoint. An outsider may wonder whether Louisiana
considered this issue before it decided to adopt Article 9 of
the U.C.C. No doubt the pressures on Louisiana to adopt
the U.C.C. were comparable with the pressures on Scotland
to adopt the floating charge.92
The vision of the civil law’s interaction with the proposed article nine, in this
commentators view is mediated by a failure to deal consistently with terms of attachment
and perfection in the civil code’s notion of a property system. The narrative is thus
construed as tale that creates more of a problem than a solution.
Shael Herman narrates the story in a more positive tone:
To promote harmony with its sister states, Louisiana has
sometimes adopted, and then adapted, legislation from
mainstream American law. [For example], even when
Louisiana lawmakers have consciously preferred national
uniformity over the state’s historical traditions, they have
reached compromises between the two. Embedded in the
working habits of lawyers and Courts, the Civil Code has
assured that the mainstream American law at issue would
bear a Civilian stamp. In the regulation of movable
security, the Civil Code has remained a repository of
solutions not expressly articulated in Article 9 of the
U.C.C. As a gapfiller and a source of analogies for
unanticipated cases, the Civil Code fulfills for Louisiana
lawyers a role played by the general common law
jurisprudence in the other states.93
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This vision of the Civil law in Louisiana then, according to Shael, is the preservation of a
Civil Code that both “mediates the common law influence,” as well as translates the
Common Law rubric into a civilian language. Thus, Shael notes
Following the nomenclature of the civil code, for example,
Louisiana’s initial version of U.C.C. article 9 defined real
estate as “immovable property and real rights therein,”
personal property as “movable property,” tangibles as
“corporeal” property, and intangibles as “incorporeal
property.” Particularly important for the reformers case in
favor of Article 9, its enactment did not require shortcircuiting or abandoning the Civil Code, even for security
devices regulated by the article. For example, the term
possession in section 9-109 incorporated the phrase “civil
possession as defined in Civil Code articles 3421 and
3431.94
Article 9 was compatible with the civilian system, not just because it did not offend the
Code, but because in key places it incorporated the code.
***
Both narratives demonstrate that being civilian means to a certain extent looking
civilian, sounding civilian, and acting civilian. The Slavery narrative, though
demonstrates the pervasive respect and admiration we have for a code. The Article 9
narrative in turn, demonstrates how the respect influences and defines the ways we
approach legal innovation.
Part III
Why a Nomos
Inhabiting a Nomos is not an option. Recognizing our Nomos, its effects on the
way we think about legal problems, and the consequences that come from such
recognitions is a different story. My concern with creating new “legal families” is that it
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tends to ignore the valuable lessons we learn from self-recognition. Principally, the
debate of French versus Spanish influence on the laws of Louisiana is not possible
without a Nomos; our Court would be constrained against being unique amongst its
judicial fellows; and our Code would be just another lengthy statute, with very little
normative material, but just policy decisions by elected officials.
Instead a Nomos empowers a community to understand what it is, what it is
becoming, and what it imagines it can be. As Robert Cover elegantly stated:
The great legal civilizations have, therefore, been marked
by more than technical virtuosity in their treatment of
practical affairs, by more than elegance or rhetorical power
in the composition of their texts, by more, even, than
genius in the invention of new forms for new problems. A
great legal civilization is marked by the richness of the
nomos in which it is located and which it helps to
constitute. The varied and complex materials of that nomos
establish paradigms for dedication, acquiescence,
contradiction, and resistance. These materials present not
only bodies of rules or doctrine to be understood, but also
worlds to be inhabited. To inhabit a nomos is to know how
to live in it.95
And so I return to the initial analogy I offered at the beginning of this essay, and ask, are
we civilians standing on the walls, guarding our institutions from the encroaching
barbarians. I say if we inhabit a nomos, we needn’t worry about their vulgar institutions
on our legal system. Our nomos defines itself so that the innovation brought by the
“commoners” need not threaten our own institutional perception.
Likewise we needn’t sit from the coliseum either, waiting to see which gladiator
will win our praise. I say, if we inhabit a nomos the contests that we view as so
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imperative towards defining who we are, actually don’t define us at all. Our Nomos
defines us. La Fin!

